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THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF DIVORCE IN
THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION
Shaakirrah R. Sanders*
INTRODUCTION
When first enacted in 1969 by the California Legislature, no-
fault divorce was thought to be a revolutionary and radical idea;
it was neither. This article is a comparative analysis of the
evolution of divorce in the western legal tradition from classical
Rome through the twentieth century. The first section of this
article will analyze divorce in Classical Rome. This is followed by
a discussion on the Catholic Church's Doctrine of Indissolubility,
which mandated an absolute ban on divorce. The article then
explores the Protestant Revolution's rejection of the Doctrine of
Indissolubility and the limited grounds under which divorce could
be obtained. Then, the article discusses the secularization of
divorce actions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and
the expansion of fault grounds. This is followed by a discussion of
divorce in the United States and the practice of migratory
divorce. Next, the article examines the re-emergence of no-fault
divorce in Western Europe and North America. Finally, the
article discusses Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Act and its
return to a fault-based regime of divorce.
I. ROMAN LAW OF DIVORCE
"Divorce, the separation of spouses, and the dissolution of
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Orleans School of Law, where she served as Index/Casenote Editor of the Loyola Law
Review. Most recently, Ms. Sanders was an American Inns of Court Foundation
Pegasus Scholar, for which she traveled to London, England in the spring of 2004 for
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407
408 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 50
marriage, is a question of family law which is [as] alive today as
it was in classical Roman times."' Yet, during the classical
period, the joining of two people was not described as marriage
(and nor was the dissolution of that union described as divorce).
In classical Rome, marriage was a not judicial relationship, but a
state of fact. Formalities that existed in the Middle Ages, and
still exist in modern times, were unnecessary to contract classical• 2
marriage. Therefore, divorce and grounds for divorce were
nonexistent.
This, however, does not mean that there were no provisions
for ending the union. The Twelve Tables3 provided for divorce by
mutual consent and the dissolution of the marriage without a
decree by any court.4  "The consequence of this non-judicial
relationship was that from the moment the affectio maritalis' no
longer existed, the marriage was over; [therefore, d]ivorce
according to classical law only signified the absence of the affectio
maritalis."6 Public officials required nothing, and the dissolution
1. Peter J. Riga, Divorce in the Justinian Code: Harbinger of Things to Come?, 8
WHITTIER L. REV. 917, 917 (1987) (citation omitted).
2. Id. at 918. "In Roman law, marriage was a relatively private matter. No
special formula or ceremony was required to contract a valid marriage. There was no
requirement of intervention by any sort of a public official, and there was no
registration of marriages." R. H. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND 4 (1974).
3. The Twelve Tables was a codification of existing customs of classical Rome
into statutory law. This earliest of Roman codes contained seventy-six civil laws and
was "set up in the Roman Forum on twelve tables of bronze." Richard A. Pacia,
Roman Contributions to American Civil Jurisprudence, 49 R.I. B.J. 5, 6 (May 2001).
The Twelve Tables "established a procedural framework for the prompt and efficient
adjudication of civil disputes. An array of procedures were enacted specifically to
govern the conduct of civil litigation." Id. Drafted between 451-450 B.C., the Twelve
Tables remained the foundation of Roman law for over 1000 years, until it was
superseded by Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis in 534 A.D. Id. at 6.
4. RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN
SOCIETY 18 (1988).
5. "According to classical law, marriage was a co-habitation of the spouses
founded on a reciprocal desire of will which was conceptually indispensable and
which had to endure throughout the whole length of the marriage itself. In the
classical period, this intention and conformity was called the affectio maritalis."
Riga, supra note 1, at 918.
6. Id. The right to divorce could also exist for cause and was obligatory for
adultery. Id. at 919. The causes for divorce, other than adultery, however, were
neither well defined nor enumerated. Id. at 920. This is without consequence,
because "the right to divorce without limit existed throughout the classical period."
Id. at 919.
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of the marriage was left to the parties directly concerned.7
With the emergence of Christianity and the formation of the
Roman Catholic Church, the classical idea of marriage was
increasingly attacked." During the early years of the Church,
Roman legislation resisted changes to the law of divorce. 9
However, by the middle of the third century, Roman emperors
weakened and allowed restrictions on the ability to end the
marital union.'° "Legislation, hostile to divorce, started with the
Emperor Constantine who ... [attempted] to moderate the
antagonism between the Roman rules and the teachings of the
church."" Absolute adherence to the Christian rule of complete
indissolubility of marriage was not possible at this time, for
Romans would have found this unacceptable. Yet, in the
Constitution of Constantine, a major shift towards the Christian
view is evident.
3
The Constantine Constitution established causes that
permitted a husband or wife to divorce the other. "The husband
had the right to divorce his wife if she were an adulteress, a
poisoner or a conspirator. The wife could divorce her husband if
he were a murderer, a prisoner or a violator of graves. "  In 449
A.D., the Emperor Theodosius introduced and enforced more
stringent rules and regulations for divorce." These new
regulations placed more restrictions on the wife's ability to
divorce her husband than on the husband's ability to divorce his
wife.
16
7. HELMHOLZ, supra note 2, at 4.
8. Riga, supra note 1, at 920. "The essential differences between the views on
marriage in Roman and Christian law were evident." Id. at 921. Christianity held
that marriage from its inception was indissoluble. This idea was founded on the
Gospels, on the teachings of St. Paul, and formulated by Augustine of Hippo, who
declared that although adultery was the only reason for divorce, the bonds of
marriage remained intact. Id. at 920-21.
9. Id. at 921.
10. Id. at 921-22.
11. Id. at 921.
12. Id.
13. The Constantine Constitution was enacted in 331 A.D. Id. at 922.
14. Riga, supra note 1, at 922. A husband or wife could repudiate the other for
less serious offenses or for no specified reason at all, but in such cases remarriage
was either forbidden or, if permitted, permitted only after a long lapse of time from
the date of repudiation." PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 18.
15. Riga, supra note 1, at 922.
16. Id. For example,
According to the new rules, a wife was authorized to divorce her husband if he
2004] 409
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By the middle of the sixth century, the influence of
Christianity could no longer be denied. In the Eastern Roman
Empire, the Emperor Justinian7 revised the Roman law of
divorce in the novellae laws concerning marriage. 8 However, in
were [sic] an adulterer, an assassin, a poisoner, a conspirator against the
emperor, a violator of graves, a pillager of temples, a brigand, or a receiver and
protector of brigands. In addition, divorce was authorized if the husband had
continuous sexual relations with unchaste women in his home, attempted to kill
his wife by sword, poison or otherwise, or mistreated his wife in a manner
unworthy of free men.
A husband could not divorce his wife for cause unless she were an adulteress, a
poisoner, a murderer, a temple stealer, a brigand, if she stayed the night away
from the conjugal home with strange men (without permission and in spite of
her husband's protest), if she took part in circus performances or the theatre in
spite of her husband's protest, if she attempted to kill her husband by the sword,
poison, or in any other manner, if she took part in a conspiracy against the
emperor, if she went to the baths with strange men, or if she raised her hand
against her husband.
Id. If divorce took place for reasons other than those in the constitution, the
consequence was loss of the dowry and respective nuptial gifts. Id. In cases of
divorce without just cause, the woman could remarry five years after the divorce. Id.
17. Justinian was born a peasant of the Balkans and rose to the highest station,
that of Roman Emperor. Craig A. Stern, Justinian: Lieutenant of Christ, Legislator
for Christendom, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 151, 151 (1999). He began his reign in 527
A.D. Id. at 152. During his reign, Justinian ordered "the production of the summary
of Roman law, the Corpus Juris Civilis, the body of civil law, as it has been called
since the Middle Ages." Id. at 157. This body of laws
remains the foundation of law for most of Christendom and beyond, and of
impact even upon the non-civil system of the common law of English-speaking
countries. Like the reconquest of the west and the ecclesiastical building
program, the writing of the Corpus Juris Civilis expressed Justinian's obedience
to his divine call to rule Christendom after God's design.... In effect, this work
was an update of the previous Code assembled by the Emperor Theodosius a
century before.
Id. at 157-58. See also Pacia, supra note 3, at 31 (discussing the Digest of Justinian).
The Corpus Juris Civilis was divided into four parts: the Codex, "an updated
collection of the constitutions, statutes, and legislation of the previous Roman
emperors[,]" the Digest, "an anthology of the best writing of thirty-nine classical
jurists[,]" the Institutes, "a textbook.., to initiate law students to current
jurisprudential logic[,]" and "the Novella, which were legislative amendments to the
Codex (the first part) that were enacted in ensuing years during Justinian's reign."
Id. at 31-32.
18. Riga, supra note 1, at 923. In classical Rome, "marriage depended upon the
ongoing intent of the parties. Marriages lasted only so long as both parties intended
to remain married, not unlike the contemporary American regime under 'no-fault'
divorce." Stern, supra note 17, at 162-63. This concept was replaced by Justinian in
the Corpus Juris Civilis "with a Christian understanding of marriage, a covenantal
understanding. Marriage remains dependent upon the intent of the parties, but that
intent is encapsulated in a covenant, a solemn commitment of the parties that would
perdure through any later change of heart." Id.
While "Justinian prohibited and punished divorce,... [he] did not declare it
impossible ... [for] divorce without any cause. . . was not permitted, but once done
was valid." Riga, supra note 1, at 923, 925. Soon after, however, Justinian
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the declining Western Roman Empire, divorce not only persisted,
but "the Germanic codifications of law between fifth and ninth
centuries.., tended to allow divorce, either by mutual consent or
unilaterally. The terms of the latter generally favored the
husband."' Thus, although the Eastern and Western empires
still allowed for divorce, the influence of the Roman Catholic
Church changed the scope of divorce law in Western Europe. °
II. INFLUENCE OF THE CANON LAW AND ROMAN
CATHOLIC CHURCH
The tension between the Roman view and the Canonical
view of marriage was the ability of the parties to end the union.
This can be attributed to differences in the Roman and Canonical
ideology of marriage.2' In any event, it is difficult to say exactly
introduced something entirely different in Novella 117. Id. at 926. "All divorces ex
communi consensu (voluntary dissolution) were forbidden... [when] Justinian
declared that a simple agreement between the spouses would no longer suffice for
divorce... [and] that marriage could end only for the enumerated causae." Id.
(footnote omitted). This new law reveals the emperor's desire that the law at least
"approach the Christian ideal concerning marriage and divorce." Id. at 927 (footnote
omitted). Thus "[miarriage, a question of fact during the classical period, became a
judicial relationship under the influence of the Church." Id. (footnote omitted).
In latter novellae, the emperor came closer and closer to adopting the Christian ideal
of indissolubility. Riga, supra note 1, at 929-30. Yet, the imperial disposition of a
total prohibition of mutual divorce did not last long and was revoked by Justinian II
after the death of Justinian in 566 A.D. Id. at 930. Justinian II also allowed his
citizens to have "the possibility of freeing themselves from the miseries of bad
marriages" when he declared in Novella 140 that "Novella 117 was impossible to
enforce." Id. (footnote omitted).
19. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 23. The husband "was permitted to repudiate his
wife if she were guilty of adultery or if she were unable to have children." Id.
(citation omitted).
20. At this time, the Western legal tradition was "a continuity of legal ideas and
institutions, which gr[e]w by accretion and adaptation. The exact shape of these
ideas and institutions... [became to be influenced] in part, by the underlying
religious belief systems of the people ruling and being ruled." John Witte, Jr., A New
Concordance of Discordant Canons: Harold J. Berman on Law and Religion, 42
EMORY L.J. 523, 534 (1993). Because the focus of this work is on divorce in the
Western legal tradition, there will be no further discussion of divorce in the Eastern
Roman Empire.
21. See Riga, supra note 1, at 928.
Before the advent of Christianity, Roman law, because it was indifferent to
marriage and divorce as legal phenomena, authorized divorce by mutual or even
unilateral consent[;] so fundamental for the Roman social outlook was an
unfettered freedom of divorce[,l that even a spousal agreement not to divorce
was deemed void as incompatible with the Roman idea of marriage.
Christianity, after acquiring the status of the Roman Empire's official
religion .... consolidate[d] its power over the Roman spirit by means of a radical
change in traditional attitudes toward divorce and its regulation.
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when the Christian view of divorce eventually became the
22majority rather than the minority view in Western Europe.
However, "[d]uring the eighth century the divergence that had
been apparent between secular and ecclesiastical legal codes
began to close in favor of the non-dissolubilist position.2 3 This
result came about largely by the efforts of Charlemagne, who
wanted to "strengthen marriage law."24  The Roman Catholic
Church was eventually successful in gaining exclusive control
over matrimonial questions. By the ninth century,25 the civil
courts throughout Western Europe uniformly applied the
26indissolubility doctrine. This influence was strengthened during
the tenth through twelfth centuries during the "emergence of
canon law as a systematized and autonomous discipline, with a
Shael Herman, Legacy and Legend: The Continuity of Roman and English
Regulation of the Jews, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1781, 1790 (1992).
Marriage, [as] a question of fact.., became a judicial relationship under the
influence of the Church. The Roman principle, in which marriage was concluded
and maintained by the constant and reciprocal will of the spouses, consensus
factit nuptias, was accepted as such by the Church. This reciprocal will was
interpreted differently, however, by Roman and ecclesiastical jurisprudence.
According to Roman law, the voluntary agreement of the spouses marked their
reciprocal affection. According to the Church, however, this willful agreement of
the spouses established a contract. The contract existed at the conclusion of the
marriage ceremony, and throughout the lifetime of each partner.... [Moreover,
a]ccording to the doctrine of the Church, marriage was a sacrament of indelible
character. Consequently the bond, once established was indissoluble. Thus,
dissolution of the marriage [allowable under Roman law] was incompatible with
the Christian concept of marriage.
Riga, supra note 1, at 928 (citation omitted).
22. It has been said that "[t]he first transformation occurred in the fourth through
sixth centuries, when the Christian (and less so, the Jewish) concept of marriage as a
monogamous, heterosexual, life-long union came to dominate Roman and later
Germanic law." Witte, supra note 20, at 548. During that time, "[tiraditional Roman
and Germanic practices of polygamy, concubinage, incest, homosexuality, abortion,
and infanticide-that were [previously] part of the Roman legal tradition-were
proscribed." Id.
23. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 24.
24. Id. Convoked by Charlemagne in 789A.D., the Ninth Synod of Carthage
"prohibited the remarriage of any person who had been repudiated by his or her
spouse. Eight years later the Council of Friuli decreed unequivocally that adultery
did not dissolve marriage, although an adulteress could be punished and her
husband could obtain a separation a mensa et thoro from her." Id. (citation omitted).
"The freedom to contract marriage was first recognized by Gratian and the decretists
who followed him." Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Canonistic Contribution to the Western
Rights Tradition: An Historical Inquiry, 33 B.C. L. REV. 37, 72 (1991). Gratian's
repudiation of the validity of coerced marriages was also accepted by canon lawyers.
Id. at 75.
25. See David Millon, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in Medieval England, 1984 U.
ILL. L. REV. 621 (1984).
26. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 24.
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theoretical framework that occasionally overlapped with, but was
also distinct from, other disciplines such as theology and
philosophy.
2 7
"The divorce doctrine that the Roman Catholic Church had
developed by the late Middle Ages... can be stated with
deceptive simplicity and brevity: A valid celebrated Christian
marriage was dissoluble only by the death of one of the spouses.
'28
This was not to say that couples were forbidden to dissolve a
validly celebrated Christian marriage. 29  However, for the most
part, many alternative remedies for dissolution (i.e. non-
consummated marriage and Pauline Privilege) were rarely
303
practiced. Couples could seek to annul a marriage31 or request a
27. Reid, supra note 24, at 42. In the twelfth century, "a systematic Roman
Catholic theology and canon law of marriage and the family came to dominate the
West." Witte, supra note 20, at 548-49. Because marriage was seen as a holy
sacrament, its conceptual foundation was on the laws of nature, scripture and
morality, which were areas where the Church had exclusive jurisdiction. Witte,
supra note 20, at 549. "By the thirteenth century, the Catholic Church was generally
recognized as [also] possessing exclusive jurisdiction over marriage [and divorce]
cases throughout Western Europe." Reid, supra note 24, at 82. Today, "[wiell over
one hundred canons address issues of marriage and ecclesiastical marriage courts."
Joel A. Nichols, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward a More
Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 980 (1998).
28. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 2 (citations omitted). The Council of Trent
established this doctrine in canon law in the 1560s. Id. at 3. "The essential
properties of marriage are unity and indissolubility, thus leaving no option for
'divorce' in the modern sense of that term." Nichols, supra note 27, at 980. In canon
law, "divorce was understood to result in the termination of the conjugal right,
although the marriage bond itself would continue to endure." Reid, supra note 24, at
85.
29. The Pauline Privilege allows the dissolution of a marriage when one member
of the union is not a Christian. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 3. A marriage that was
not consummated could also be dissolved. Id. However, "dissolution was not possible
once the marriage had been consummated." Id. at 2-3 (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 3. A validly celebrated Christian marriage was indissolvable with few
exceptions. Id. at 2. The Pauline Privilege allowed the Christian spouse to remarry
if the unbelieving spouse deserted the marriage. Id. Another exception existed if the
marriage had not been consummated.
31. "The list of diriment impediments recognized by the Catholic Church as
capable of rendering a marriage null is long and has changed over time." PHILLIPS,
supra note 4, at 5 (citation omitted). Yet most well-known impediments "are those
based on consanguinity and affinity-relationship of the married parties by blood
and marriage, respectively." Id. By the twelfth century, the prohibited degree of
relation was seven degrees. Id. at 6. However in 1215A.D., the Fourth Lateran
Council "reduced the prohibitions on consanguinity and affinity from seven to four
degrees." Id. Other impediments included a precontract of marriage, impotency,
lack of consent, secrecy, and "where one of the parties had previously taken religious
vows or where one of them had attacked the sanctity of the previous marriage of the
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grant of separation.2 Yet, these remedies were also rarely used,
and when sought, were rarely granted.33 Modern divorce did not
exist in medieval Europe because "marriages validly entered into
were theoretically indissoluble."'
4
Besides separation or annulment, an unhappy husband
could also rid himself of an unwanted spouse by repudiation or
"self divorce. '" 5 This remedy was not infrequently used during the
Middle Ages,36 and allowed a man to, in effect, obtain a divorce
when he leaves his first wife and takes another as his wife. 7
However, when the deserted wife objected, multi-party litigation
often resulted.38
By the 1500s, self-divorce and repudiation of a spouse
without recourse to the Church became less acceptable. More
care was taken to secure a formal sentence of dissolution before
passing a new marriage. By this time, the standards of the
other, either by killing his or her partner or by committing adultery with a promise
to marry as soon as the accomplice was free to do so." Id. at 8.
32. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 13. Separation as an alternate remedy was
introduced into the canon law in the twelfth century. Id. "Canon law admitted three
principal grounds for separation: adultery, cruelty, and heresy and apostasy (which
were thought of as spiritual fornication)." Id.
Adultery was permitted as a ground for divorce on the basis of scriptural
authority. "Spiritual fornication," which was understood as a lapse into heresy,
or conversion to Judaism or Islam, was treated analogously to carnal adultery.
Like the non-offending spouse in an adultery case, the Catholic Christian spouse
in cases of spiritual fornication was free to seek an ecclesiastical divorce.
Reid, supra note 24, at 85. Cruelty, or saevitia (violence) "was built on a decretal of
Alexander III, and on a decretal of [Pope] Innocent III." Id. Those decretals ordered
judges "not to restore the wife to her husband if his violence was obvious, and to
provide instead for her safekeeping." Id. at 86.
33. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 9, 15.
34. HELMHOLZ, supra note 2, at 74. While the term divorce was used throughout
medieval records, its use normally referred to annulments and judicial separations.
Id.
35. See id. (noting that this remedy usually was not available to women).
36. Id. at 62.
37. Id. at 59.
38. Id. at 60. Men usually claimed the right to repudiate their wives along with a
reason for the invalidity of the first marriage. HELMHOLZ, supra note 2, at 59.
Multi-party litigation resulted when the second wife and/or some man from the first
wife's past became involved. Id. at 59-63. "The number of these multi-party suits
brought before the ... courts was substantial and also shows [in] a particularly clear
way[,] the freedom people felt to regulate their marital affairs without direct
intervention by the Church courts." Id. at 58-59 (citation omitted). For examples of
multi-party cases brought before the courts and difficulties with evidentiary
standards in those cases, see id. at 60-65, 81-85, 88.
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Church were absorbed in to the law of marriage and divorce.
Soon however, the Roman Catholic Church's Doctrine of
Indissolubility would be attacked.
III. THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION HALTS FULL
ADOPTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF INDISSOLUBILITY
"The first fifteen hundred years of the Christian Era
witnessed the progressive removal of divorce from European legal
codes.... [However] from the sixteenth century onward the
acceptability of divorce underwent a renaissance as a result of the
Protestant Reformation." 9 The Protestant Reformers denied the
idea that marriage was a holy sacrament,4° as endorsed by the
Roman Catholic Church, and advocated the possibility of divorce
under certain circumstances.4' Moreover, "[blecause of their
emphasis on the pedagogical role of the church and the family,
and the priestly calling of all believers, the [Protestant] reformers
insisted that both marriage and divorce be public. '4 2 To be sure,
Protestants had divergent views on the availability of marriage.
Those that will briefly be discussed in this article include the
views held by Luther, Calvin, and the Continental Reformers
Zwingli and Bucer.
39. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 40 (citation omitted).
40. Instead, marriage was a social concept. Witte, supra note 20, at 550. 'The
marital unit, though divinely ordained, was viewed as an institution of the earthly
kingdom. Participation required no prerequisite faith or purity and conferred no
sanctifying grace, as did true sacraments." Id.
41. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 45. However, "[m]uch of the traditional canon law
of marriage and the family was appropriated by civil authorities in... [the]
Protestant countries." Witte, supra note 20, at 550. For example, "[pirohibitions
against unnatural relations and infringement of marital functions remained in effect
[and i]mpediments that protected free consent, that implemented Biblical
prohibitions against marriage of relatives, and that governed the couple's physical
relations were largely retained." Id. The
[Niew Protestant theory of marriage and the family also yielded legal changes.
Before the reformers rejected the subordination of marriage to celibacy, they
rejected laws that forbade clerical and monastic marriage, that denied
remarriage to those who had married a cleric or monastic, and that permitted
vows of chastity to annul vows of marriage. Because they rejected the
sacramental nature of marriage, the reformers rejected impediments of crime
and heresy and prohibitions against divorce on grounds of adultery, desertion,
cruelty, or frigidity.
Id.
42. Witte, supra note 20, at 551. "Marriage promises required parental consent,
witnesses, church consecration and registration, and priestly instruction. Couples
who wished to divorce had to announce their intentions in the church and community
and petition a civil judge to dissolve the bond." Id.
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The Lutheran model was most prominent in sixteenth
century Protestant Germany, but was also an influence on
divorce legislation in other parts of Western Europe as far as• • 43
Scandinavia. The Lutheran divorce doctrine permitted the
dissolution of marriage in the following circumstances: adultery,
desertion, and the refusal of sexual intercourse. Yet, Lutheran
believed that "matrimonial problems should be resolved not by
laws, 'but by the circumstances and according to equity and the
judgement of a good man."'" Moreover, Lutheran was reluctant
to counsel divorce unless all other alternatives had been tried. 4
Even when the parties were unable to reconciliate, thereby
making divorce the only remedy, a divorce was neither quick nor
46 47easy to obtain. This was especially true in desertion cases.
The Calvinist model allowed divorce of the marriage on
grounds of adultery and desertion, which gave rise to the
presumption of adultery.5 However, Calvin expressly ruled outdivoce bsedon eotinal ... 49
divorce based on emotional incompatibility. Calvin's model was
50reflected in sixteenth century Swiss divorce law. Calvin's view
also had an almost immediate effect in Scotland, where adultery
and desertion remained the only two grounds recognized for
divorce until 1938.51
While Luther and Calvin were the most influential of the
Protestant Reformers, Zwingli's and Bucer's theories were also
used as models for divorce reform in Western European
Protestant states. Zwingli's ordinance allowed adultery as the
43. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 50.
44. Id. at 48 (citation omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Luther's requirement to establish the whereabouts of the departed spouse and
determine that "the partner who was to benefit from the divorce was not responsible
for the other's desertion" created difficulty for the deserted spouse. Id. at 49 (citation
omitted).
48. John Calvin held the view that adultery as a ground for dissolution of the
marriage was "derived from the Old Testament's injunction that an adulterous wife
should be put to death." Id. at 53 (citation omitted).
49. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 54 (citation omitted). Calvin held the view that an
unhappy marriage "was a result of original sin and had to be borne like its other
effects, however unpleasant they might be." Id. Yet, Calvin did warn husbands not
to be cruel to their spouses and that wife beating was to be avoided. Id. The
husband's role, according to Calvin, is one of "companionship rather than kingship."
Id.
50. Id. at 56-60.
51. Id. at 60-61.
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prime ground for divorce, but other grounds included "destroying
life, endangering life, being mad or crazy, offending by
whorishness, leavings one's spouse without permission,
remaining abroad a long time, having leprosy, or other such
reasons, of which no rule can be made on account of their
dissimilarity. '5 2 This ordinance was enacted in Zurich.53 Bucer, a
radical libertarian, adopted a doctrine of divorce permitting the
"dissolution of marriage under a broad range of circumstances,
including matrimonial offenses and mutual consent."5 4  The
Radical Reformers of the Anabaptist churches and sects
restricted the grounds for divorce only to adultery.55
England is the only country in which an established or
dominant reformed church did not part from the Roman Catholic
doctrine of marital indissolubility.56 Divorce legislation did not
arise in England until the nineteenth century.57 The Church of
England's eventual break from the Roman Catholic Church
occurred when King Henry attempted to rid himself of his wife,
Catherine of Aragon. 58 However, by the end of the seventeenth
century, an English procedure developed to permit dissolution by
a private act of Parliament, and this was the only means by
which a divorce could be obtained until 1857."9
IV. SECULARIZATION AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION OF
THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES
Intervention by the monarchs in marriage and divorce law,
both on a personal basis and by edicts and statutes, "not only
added to the secular element in legislation and jurisdiction but
also extended divorce policies significantly."60  Throughout
Western Europe, the divorce courts established during the
52. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 63 (citation omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 69.
55. Id. at 66-67.
56. Id. at 71 (citation omitted).
57. Actually, "the Church of England... dramatically limited the scope of
annulments previously available under Roman Catholic canon law, thus becoming
'more popish than the pope."' J. Herbie DiFonzo, Paradox of Change: The English
Background to the California Divorce Revolution, 22 LINCOLN L. REV. 31, 33-34
(1994) (citation omitted).
58. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 71, 77.
59. Id. at 95.
60. Id. at 202.
2004] 417
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Reformation gradually secularized."' In England, the price of
parliamentary dissolutions of marriage had the effect of
secularizing the law of marriage and divorce.6 ' In France,
legislative control over marriage effectively passed from the
church to the monarchy with the establishment of Royal Courts
in the late eighteenth century.13 It is important to note that
"[tihese developments were not peculiar to matrimonial law but
were an integral part of a broad process by which the European
states arrogated functions that their churches had been
accustomed to performing. "64
A major influence on legislators, legal commentators, and
15theorists was the theory of natural law. Natural law
philosophers "sought to discover a legal code that was rounded in
criteria more general and enduring than the mere practical needs
of mankind. This law, they believed, could be discovered by the
application of reason. ' 6 Grotius, one of the founders of modern
natural law theory, originally conceived of the purpose of
marriage to be procreation, but subsequently amended his view of
marriage to include social ends, such as mutual assistance and
67comfort. It is against this backdrop that the secularization ofdivorce legislation occurred.
One of the more important legislative developments in
Europe in the nineteenth century was the passage of England's
68divorce law in 1857. This marked the end of England's threecentury long struggle to catch up with the rest of Protestant
61. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 203.
62. Id. However, before a divorce by act of parliament could be ordered, one had
to first "obtain a separation a mensa et thoro [from bed and board] from a church
court to demonstrate that his wife was guilty of adultery, or... that her husband
was guilty of aggravated adultery." Id. at 204. For a comprehensive analysis of
English marriage and divorce laws from the sixteenth century, see Danaya C.
Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody: A History of the Birth of Family Law in
England, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 175, 176-82, 238-49 (2002); Wendie Ellen
Schneider, Secrets and Lies: The Queen's Proctor and Judicial Investigation of Party-
Controlled Narratives, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 449, 453-62 (2002); and Hazel D.
Lord, Husband and Wife: English Marriage Law from 1750: A Bibliographic Essay,
11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 1, 1-3, 12-26 (2001).
63. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 205.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 210.
66. Id. at 211 (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 210-11.
68. Id. at 412.
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Europe in the area of divorce law. 69 This legislation transferred
jurisdiction over divorce matters from Parliament to a special
court, called the Court of Divorce.7 ° Under the 1857 divorce
legislation, divorce was available "for reason of adultery (or
aggravated adultery, depending on the sex of the defendant).
Judicial separation under the Act replaced those that had been
granted by the ecclesiastical courts."7' Although England sported
one of the lowest divorce rates in Europe even after the 1857
legislation, the increase in divorce after 1857 was significant.
In France, the late eighteenth century saw the enactment of
divorce legislation, but the beginning of the nineteenth century
saw its limitation and eventually, its abolishment.73 However, in
1884, divorce was restored and allowed on "grounds of the wife's
adultery, the husband's adultery if it were committed in the
marital dwelling, either spouse's 'outrageous conduct, ill-usage, or
grievous injuries,' or the condemnation of either spouse to an
infamous punishment."
74
The evolution of divorce legislation in Germany was closely
linked to the formation and consolidation of the German
Empire.75  German nations, which had already reformed their
divorce law during the Protestant Reformation, gradually
expanded the grounds for which divorce could be obtained. In
Prussia for example, divorce was available on eleven broad
grounds including: adultery or unnatural vices; desertion; refusal
of sexual intercourse; impotence; raging insanity or madness;
violence, attempted murder, or repeated and unfounded
69. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 412-20.
70. Id. at 420.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 421. During the 1850s the annual average for divorce acts was four, but
beginning in 1858, the number rose to between two and three hundred a year. Id.
73. Id. at 175-90. In 1792, divorce law of the French Revolutionaries specified
that marriage was dissoluble by divorce on principles of both matrimonial fault or
the breakdown of marriage, which required no proof, or attribution of fault and could
be brought unilaterally on the ground of incompatibility of temperament. PHILLIPS,
supra note 4, at 178. By 1803, divorce had been restricted in Napoleonic law to fault
grounds of cruelty, adultery and condemnation to certain degrading forms of
punishment. Id. at 185. Divorce on the grounds of reason of incompatibility of
temperament was abolished. Id. Moreover, marriage could not be dissolved by
mutual consent unless it lasted for more than two years, and no divorce could be
obtained for a marriage lasting over twenty years or by a woman over forty-five. Id.
In 1816 divorce was abolished by decree of King Louis XVIII. Id. at 189.
74. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 424-25 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 428 (citation omitted).
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defamatory accusation; acts of felony or pursuing a disreputable
occupation; leading a disorderly life; continued refusal by
husband to maintain his wife; giving up the Christian religion;
and insurmountable aversion or the mutual consent to separate,
where there were no children of the marriage or if there were• 76
children, where there were exceptional circumstances. Many
other German states followed the Prussian model;77 yet, divorce
by mutual consent was not recognized by all of the German
states.5
Austrian divorce reform in the nineteenth century was one of
the most turbulent in Europe. 9 By 1870, divorce grounds, "Which
remained formally denied to Austrian Catholics until the Nazi
divorce law of 1938, included adultery, condemnation for certain
crimes, willful desertion, having an infectious disease, ill-
treatment, and threats.' 0  Switzerland reformed its divorce law
in 1874 to allow divorce on the grounds of adultery, willful
desertion, insanity, and being sentenced to a degrading
punishment.8
Nineteenth century Spaniard divorce law also underwent a
turbulent reformation.82  By 1889, the only relief available to
76. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 428.
77. Id. at 430.
78. Id. Many German states that did not allow divorce by mutual consent did
make "allowance for their respective regents to dissolve individual marriages, a type
of executive divorce not available in Prussia." Id.
79. Id. at 432.
In the first half of the century divorce was permitted to non-Catholics under the
terms of the 1811 General Civil Code, but the restoration of a conservative
monarchy after the revolution of 1848 led to a reaction against liberal ideas and
politics. In 1855, a concordat was signed that transferred control of marriage to
the Catholic Church, thus effectively eliminating the possibility of divorce for all
Austrians, regardless of their religious affiliation. ... This retreat ... provoked
such a reaction, however, that the clauses dealing with marriage in the 1855
concordat were abrogated in 1868.
Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id. See also Barbara Graham-Siegenthaler, International Marriage and
Divorce Regulation and Recognition in Switzerland, 29 FAM. L.Q. 685, 685-87, 690-93
(1995).
82. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 433.
A[n] 1870 law transferred control of marriage from the ecclesiastical to the
secular authorities, but the tension between church and state, and between
conservative and liberal tendencies quickly became apparent. The
secularization of marriage created such a reaction that in 1875 it was repealed
and obligatory religious marriage reinstated; only Spaniards who could prove
that they were not Roman Catholics were permitted to go through a civil
marriage ceremony. Even so, divorce was not possible for non-Catholics [or
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unhappily married Spanish couples was the separation a mensa
83
et thoro . Nearby, "the Portuguese Civil Code of 1867 ruled out
the possibility of divorce by declaring marriage to be a 'perpetual
contract."8 4 Portugal did not legalize divorce until the twentieth
85 86century.85 Neither did Ireland. In both Holland and Scotland,
divorce in the eighteenth century was allowed by traditional
customs.87
V. DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES
The development of divorce law in the United States was
88similar to the various nations in Europe. In seventeenth
century New England, divorce was fault based, much like its
Protestant counterparts, and was permitted on grounds of
adultery, desertion (five years), impotence, fraudulent contract,
consanguinity, and bigamy. 89 After the American Revolution, the
divorce laws of the various states began to show some
differentiation. 9° During the first half of the nineteenth century,
divorces rates continued to increase with the westward growth of
the country.91 The general pattern was that more recently settled
Catholics].
Id. (citations omitted).
83. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 433.
84. Id. at 432-33.
85. Id. at 433. Legislation in 1910 "allowed divorce by mutual consent, converted
separation[,] and any of ten specific grounds, including adultery, absence, desertion,
ill-treatment, and addiction to gambling.... [Tjhe 1910 legislation also made
husbands and wives equal in all respects before the law... [and] made civil
marriages obligatory." Id.
86. See Lindsay L. Abbate, What God Has Joined "Let" Man Put Asunder:
Ireland's Struggle between Canon and Common Law Relating to Divorce, 16 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 583, 598-615 (2002) (detailing the history of the Irish ban on divorce);
Christine P. James, Cdad Mile Fdilte? Ireland Welcomes Divorce: The 1995 Irish
Divorce Referendum and the Family (Divorce) Act of 1996, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 175, 175-208 (1997) (same).
87. For an interesting analysis of Dutch and Scottish divorce customs and
legislation in the eighteenth century, see Rab Houston & Manon Van Der Heijden,
Hands Across the Water: The Making and Breaking of Marriage Between Dutch and
Scots in the Mid-Eighteenth Century, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 215 (1997).
88. For a brief history of American divorce laws, see Michael M. O'Hear, "Some of
the Most Embarrassing Questions": Extraterritorial Divorces and the Problem of
Jurisdiction Before Pennoyer, 104 YALE L.J. 1507, 1510-13 (1995).
89. See MARY SOMERVILLE JONES, AN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE CHANGING
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1987) (noting that remarriage was allowed
only to the innocent party).
90. JONES, supra note 89, at 19.
91. Id. at 20.
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areas enacted more liberal divorce laws." After the Civil War,
there were few changes in divorce statutes, with the exception of
South Carolina, which permitted divorce for the first time in 1869
(this law was later outlawed in 1878 and divorce was not again
permitted until 1949).93
By the turn of the century, there was a considerable body of
divorce law throughout the United States.94 During the first half
of the twentieth century, existing grounds were expanded and
additional grounds were implemented to the fault based regime.
For example, cruelty was extended in most states to include
mental cruelty.95 New grounds included nonsupport, insanity,
voluntary separation, and incompatibility. 96  Moreover,
uncontested cases increased in number.97 In general, divorce
became increasingly popular in the United States, where divorce
rates were significantly higher than in Europe.9'
In the Western States, where the laws were more liberal,
divorce rates were higher than in the Southern and Eastern
States, where the laws were more conservative. 99 The Mid-
Western States were more likely to be at the national average. 
10
These differing divorce laws resulted in the practice of migratory
divorce, which was an interesting and highly litigious feature of
American divorce law during the early part of the twentieth
century. 101
92. JONES, supra note 89, at 30-31.
93. Id. at 29.
94. Id. at 60. For example, "[aibsolute divorce could be obtained in most states on
a variety of grounds. Adultery, cruelty and desertion were found in all states. ... In
addition, conviction of a felony, drunkenness, non-support, bigamy, impotence, and
fraud were also allowable grounds in various states." Id.
95. Id. at 61.
96. Id. at 86, 108.
97. Id. at 61.
98. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 560.
99. JONES, supra note 89, at 81-83.
100. Id. at 82.
101. As used in this article, the term "migratory divorce" means the practice,
whether intentionally for the purpose of avoiding more burdensome divorce laws or
not, of one spouse seeking to obtain a divorce in a jurisdiction other than the
jurisdiction where both spouses reside. For a detailed analysis of American law on
this issue, see O'Hear, supra note 88, at 1513-34. For an analysis of European law
on this issue, see Erwin N. Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce
Decrees-A Comparative Study, 65 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1951) and Rhonda
Wasserman, Divorce and Domicile: Time to Sever the Knot, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1
(1997).
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VI. MIGRATORY DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES
To any American, lay person or constitutional scholar, the
idea that, by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution, the idea a divorce obtained in one
state is valid in every state is such a well recognized idea that it
is impossible to believe otherwise. Yet, at the turn of the century
this issue was unsettled, as shown in Atherton v. Atherton. 2 In
Atherton, Mrs. Atherton sought divorce from bed and board
against Mr. Atherton on the grounds of cruel and abusive
treatment. 13 The parties married in New York and later moved
to Louisville, Kentucky, where they resided until Mrs. Atherton
returned to New York to live with her mother. Mrs. Atherton
sought divorce in New York on January 11, 1893, while Mr.
Atherton continued his residence in Louisville, and remainedTT" 105
domiciled in the state of Kentucky. Mr. Atherton "successfully
set up a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony in a court
of Jefferson county,... Kentucky on March 14, 1893, [however]
the supreme court of New York refused to acknowledge the
decree."°6 This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals of
New York. 10'
The United States Supreme Court reversed the New York
courts' determination and held "[t]here can be no doubt that th[e
Kentucky] decree was by law and usage entitled to full faith and
credit as an absolute decree of divorce in the State of
102. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
103. Id. at 155. Mary G. Atherton and Peter Lee Atherton took marriage vows in
Clinton, Oneida County, New York. Id. At that time, Mrs. Atherton was a resident
of New York, while Mr. Atherton was a resident of Kentucky. Id.
104. Id. at 155-56. At the time Mrs. Atherton left Kentucky, "she did so with the
purpose and intention of not returning to the state of Kentucky, but of permanently
residing in the state of New York; and this purpose and intention were understood by
the defendant [Mr. Atherton] at the time." Id. at 156. The parties evidenced this
intent in an agreement entered into in Louisville and dated October 10, 1891.
Atherton, 181 U.S. at 156.
105. Id. at 156-57.
106. Id. at 159. The New York Court reasoned that Mrs. Atherton
was not personally served with process within the state of Kentucky, or at all;
nor did she in any manner appear, or authorize an appearance for her, in the
said action and proceeding.., and that before the commencement of that suit,
and ever since, she had ceased to be a resident of Kentucky and had become and
was a resident of the state of New York.
Id.
107. Id. at 160.
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Kentucky."0 8 The Court reasoned that "[tihe rule as to the notice
necessary to give full effect to a decree of divorce is different from
that which is required in suits in personam."0 9 Moreover, the
Court held that
[tihis case does not involve the validity of a divorce granted,
on constructive service, by the court of a state in which only
one of the parties ever had a domicil[e]; nor the question to
what extent the good faith of the domicil[e] may be
afterwards inquired into. In this case, the divorce in
Kentucky was by the court of the state which had always
been the undoubted domicil[e] of the husband, and which was
the only matrimonial domicil[e] of the husband and wife.
The single question to be decided is the validity of that
divorce, granted after such notice had been given as was
required by the statutes of Kentucky." °
The Court concluded that such reasonable steps had been taken
to give Mrs. Atherton notice as to bind her by the decree in the
state of domicile. 1 '
108. Atherton, 181 U.S. at 162.
109. Id. at 162-63. The Court reasoned that
[tihe purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage.
Id. at 162.
110. Id. at 171. The Court noted that Mr. Atherton
always had his domicil[e] in Kentucky, and the matrimonial [domicile] of the
parties was in Kentucky. On December 28, 1892.... [Mr. Atherton] filed his
petition for a divorce in the court of appropriate jurisdiction in Kentucky,
alleging an abandonment of him by [Mrs. Atherton] in Kentucky, and a
continuance of that abandonment for a year, which was a cause of divorce by the
laws of Kentucky. His petition truly stated, upon oath, as required by the
statutes of Kentucky, that ... [Mrs. Atherton] might be found at Clinton in the
state of New York, and that at Clinton was the postoffice [sic] nearest the place
where she might be found. As required by the statutes of Kentucky, the clerk
thereupon entered a warning order to [Mrs. Atherton] to appear in sixty days,
and appointed an attorney at law to represent her.
Id.
111. Id. at 172. The Court held all
efforts ... required by the statutes of Kentucky... were actually made to give
[Mrs. Atherton] actual notice of the suit in Kentucky, as to make the decree of
the court there, granting a divorce upon the ground that she had abandoned her
husband, as binding on her as if she had been served with notice in Kentucky, or
had voluntarily appeared in the suit. Binding her to that full extent, it
established, beyond contradiction, that she had abandoned her husband, and
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Another migratory divorce case, which was decided on the
same day as Atherton, was Bell v. Bell."'  In Bell, the Court
reviewed another decision of the New York courts. 113 Mrs. Bell
sued for divorce in the Supreme Court for the County of Erie,
New York based on adultery.1 1 4 In the New York court, Mr. Bell
pleaded a previously granted decree of divorce in the state of
Pennsylvania based on his wife's desertion.11 5
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the
Pennsylvania divorce decree obtained by Mr. Bell was invalid.1 6
The Court reasoned that at the inception of the Pennsylvania
action and at the time of rendering that decree Mrs. Bell was a
resident of the state of New York and Mr. Bell was not domiciled
in Pennsylvania.1 17 The Court ruled that constructive service was
insufficient for a divorce granted by the courts of a state in which
neither party is domiciled. 1 8
In another decision affirming the Court of Appeals of New
York, Haddock v. Haddock, 9 the Supreme Court appears to
reverse Atherton by holding that mere domicile within the state of
one party to the marriage does not confer jurisdiction to render a
precludes her from asserting that she left him on account of his cruel treatment.
To hold otherwise would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the husband to
obtain a divorce for the cause alleged, if it actually existed .... [Mrs. Atherton]
not being within the state of Kentucky, if constructive notice, with all the
precautions prescribed by the statutes of that state, were insufficient to bind her
by a decree dissolving the bond of matrimony,. . . [Mr. Atherton] could only get a
divorce by suing in the state in which she was found; and by the very fact of
suing her there he would admit that she had acquired a separate domicil[e]
(which he denied), and would disprove his own ground of action, that she had
abandoned him in Kentucky.
Id. at 172-73.
112. Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
113. Id. at 175.
114. Id. Mary Bell and Frederick Bell married in Illinois on January 24, 1878, and
thereafter lived together in New York. Id. at 176.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 177-78.
117. See Bell, 181 U.S. at 176-78 (noting that Pennsylvania requires one year
residence prior to filing a petition for divorce). Additionally, Mrs. Bell was not served
with a subpoena in the Pennsylvania divorce proceedings, although notice of the
proceeding was sent by mail. Id. at 176. The Supreme Court held "[u]pon the record,
therefore, the court in Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction of the husband's suit for
divorce, because neither party had a domicil[e] in Pennsylvania, and the decree of
divorce was entitled to no faith and credit in New York or in any other state." Id. at
178.
118. Id. at 177.
119. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
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decision against a nonresident only constructively served with
notice of the pendency of the action.12  However, the Court
distinguishes Atherton by reasoning that Atherton was solely
based on matrimonial domicile.12' After deducing the law of
122several states, the Court held that New York was not in error
by refusing to give full faith and credit to the Connecticut divorce
decree entered into evidence during the trial on Mrs. Haddock's
divorce petition."'
114
Over thirty years later, in Davis v. Davis, the Supreme
Court again appeared to overrule its previous decisions by
holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution
requires that full credit, not merely some credit, be given in each
125
state to judicial proceedings of other states. 2 Again, however,
the Court was able to distinguish its precedent. As a result, Mr.
120. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 604-06. Mrs. Haddock sued for divorce in New York,
where the parties resided and were married, obtaining personal service on Mr.
Haddock. Id. at 564. Mr. Haddock responding by alleging that he already had
obtained a divorce in Connecticut. Id. at 565. The New York court refused to give
effect to the Connecticut judgment, finding that the parties were married in New
York, never resided in Connecticut, and that Mr. Haddock had abandoned his wife
shortly after the wedding. Id. at 565.
121. Id. at 584.
122. Id. at 585-602. The Court reasoned that state laws fell into four separate
categories: (1) states that will decree a divorce based on the domicile of the plaintiff,
even if only effective within that state; (2) states that refuse to recognize and enforce
as to their own citizens decrees of divorce rendered in other states, when the court
had jurisdiction over only one of the parties; (3) states that give limited effect to
divorces rendered against its citizens based on the principles of state comity; and (4)
states that essentially give effect to decrees of divorce rendered in other states by
virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 603.
123. Id. at 605-06. According to the Court, the limited recognition given to some ex
parte decrees of divorce is not based upon the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but state
comity. Id. As a result, full faith and credit did not require New York to give effect
to Mr. Haddock's Connecticut divorce decree. Id. at 606.
124. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
125. Id. at 40-41. The Davis' were married in 1909 and lived in the District of
Columbia for almost twenty years. Id. at 35-36. Mr. Davis filed suit for limited
divorce in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 35.
The District Court ordered separation and ordered him to pay alimony. Id. at 35-36.
Mr. Davis then filed a complaint for absolute divorce in Virginia on the grounds of
separation, which was not a ground for absolute divorce in the District of Columbia.
Davis, 305 U.S. at 35-36.
Mrs. Davis was personally served and responded with an exception to jurisdiction,
alleging that neither of the parties were bona fide residents of Virginia. The court
ultimately found that it had jurisdiction to hear the case. Subsequently, the District
of Columbia refused to give full faith and credit to the Virginia divorce. Id. at 37-38.
126. See id. at 42 (noting that Mrs. Davis had actual notice of the suit and
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Davis' Virginia decree was entitled to full faith and credit in Mrs.




However, in Williams v. North Carolina (Williams /),,2 the
Supreme Court could no longer avoid overruling Haddock.129 The
Court did so under the theory that North Carolina could not
overrule a divorce decree issued by a Nevada court merely on the
grounds that Nevada's divorce law conflicted with North
Carolina's public policy. 130 However, the Court was careful to note
that this case did not involve a question of whether North
Carolina could "refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce
decrees because, contrary to the findings of the Nevada court,
North Carolina f[ound] that no bona fide domicil[e] was acquired
in Nevada." 3'
Three years later, in Williams v. North Carolina (Williams
I),132 the Court addressed that specific question and held that "we
cannot say that North Carolina was not entitled to draw the
inference that petitioners never abandoned their domicil[e]s in
North Carolina, particularly since we could not conscientiously
prefer, were it our business to do so, the contrary finding of the
Nevada court."13 3 In so ruling, the Court reasoned that in the
North Carolina proceedings, "[a]ppropriate weight was given to
the finding of domicil[e] in the Nevada decrees, and that finding
was allowed to be overturned only by relevant standards of
appeared excepting to the court's jurisdiction).
127. Davis, 305 U.S. at 43.
128. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
129. Id. at 292-93, 304. In Williams I, O.B. Williams and Lillie Shaver Hendrix
were convicted under North Carolina's bigamous cohabitation law. Id. at 289. Both
parties had received divorce decrees in Nevada from their respective ex-spouses
before marrying each other. Id. However, the North Carolina court refused to
recognize the decrees and instructed the jury in the criminal case that "a Nevada
divorce decree based on substituted service where the defendant made no appearance
would not be recognized in North Carolina." Id. at 291. The North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the convictions on the reasoning that "North Carolina was not
required to recognize the Nevada decrees under the [F]ull [Flaith and [C]redit
[C]lause of the Constitution by reason of Haddock v. Haddock." Williams I, 317 U.S.
at 291. North Carolina did not question Nevada's finding of adequate domicile. Id.
at 302.
130. Id. at 303. The North Carolina court did not question the finding that Nevada
had personal jurisdiction and obtained service on the parties. Id.
131. Id. at 302.
132. Williams v. Williams, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
133. Id. at 237.
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proof.' 34 The Court held that "North Carolina was not required to
yield her State policy because a Nevada court found that
petitioners were domiciled in Nevada when it granted them
decrees of divorce."35
When the issue came up again in Sherrer v. Sherrer,116 the
Court stated that "there is nothing in the concept of due process
which demands that a defendant be afforded a second opportunity
to litigate the existence of jurisdictional facts." 137  Relying on
Davis, the Supreme Court reasoned that
requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from
collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional
grounds in the courts of a sister State where there has been
participation by the defendant in the divorce proceedings,
where the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to
contest the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not
susceptible to such collateral attack in the courts of the State
which rendered the decree.
3 8
Noting that the Court's function was not to weigh the merits of
the competing policies of Florida and Massachusetts with respect
to divorce, the Court ruled that "where a decree of divorce is
134. Williams, 325 U.S. at 236.
135. Id. at 239. As a result, "North Carolina was entitled to find, as she did, that
they did not acquire domicil[e]s in Nevada and that the Nevada court was therefore
without power to liberate the petitioners from amenability to the laws of North
Carolina governing domestic relations." Id.
136. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1947).
137. Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 348. "Petitioner Margaret E. Sherrer and the respondent,
Edward C. Sherrer, were married in New Jersey in 1930 and from 1932, lived
together in Monerey, Massachusetts." Id. at 345. Mrs. Sherrer left Massachusetts
and moved to Florida, where she filed for divorce. Id. Mr. Sherrer "received notice
by mail of the pendency of the divorce proceedings. He retained Florida counsel who
entered a general appearance and filed an answer denying the allegations of...
[Mrs. Sherrer's] complaint, including the allegation as to ... [Mrs. Sherrer's]
residence." Id. at 345-46. Hearings were held in the Florida court, where Mrs.
Sherrer testified and entered evidence to establish a Florida residence. Mr. Sherrer
did not offer rebuttal evidence, nor did he cross-examine Mrs. Sherrer. Id. at 346.
The Florida court then entered a decree of divorce. Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 346. After
Mrs. Sherrer remarried and returned to Massachusetts with her new husband, Mr.
Sherrer instituted an action in the Probate Court of Berkshire County,
Massachusetts. Id. at 337. Both parties appeared and evidence was introduced to
prove the validity of the Florida divorce decree. The Massachusetts court found that
domicile had not been established in Florida, and refused to give the divorce
judgment of the Florida court full faith and credit. Id. at 347-48.
138. Id. at 351.
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rendered by a competent court under the circumstances [,] . . the
obligation of full faith and credit requires that such litigation
should end in the courts of the State in which the judgment was
rendered.'
139
"Once quick no-fault divorce became available throughout
most of the United States, migratory divorce retreated into
insignificance, its subsidiary issues described as 'academic'
questions, 'little more than a subject for historical 
study." 140
Moreover, as will be seen below, no-fault divorce increasingly
simplified and expedited the divorce process, which also greatly
contributed to the insignificance of migratory divorce.
VII. THE RETURN OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
"The twentieth century has witnessed a transformation
from an institutional marriage to one based on companionship.
As both marital expectations and life expectancy have increased,
so have the perceptions of failure.'' It is against this
background, that no-fault divorce re-emerged. Twentieth century
divorce legislation underwent significant changes. Until the late
1960s "[m]atrimonial fault was the essential element thatsurvvedeaclegslaive . • ,,142
survived each legislative revision. After World War II, critics
of fault based divorce gained a wider audience (or their voices
grew louder). Most surprisingly, it was England's Archbishop of
Canterbury, expressing his "dissatisfaction with the existing law
and the lax procedures in divorce courts [,]143 who called for "fault
to be dethroned as the divorce criterion and replaced by marriage
breakdown."
44
139. Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 356.
140. Jeanne Louise Carriere, "It's Ddjd Vu All Over Again". The Covenant Marriage
Act in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701, 1742
(1998).
141. DiFonzo, supra note 57, at 33.
142. Id. at 35.
143. Id. at 42. At the time, English divorce law "required proof of breaking of the
pledge of fidelity or decent behavior inherent in the marital relationship. Since
personal depravity was seen as the cause of marital breakdown, 'fault was the
undisputed touchstone of divorce policy."' Id. at 35-36 (quoting PHILLIPS, supra note
4, at 566).
144. DiFonzo, supra note 57, at 43. Although in the final proposals, the views of
the Church were largely rejected, England's Divorce Reform Act of 1969 allowed
divorce to be "obtained upon irretrievable marital breakdown, which could be proven
in one of five ways: adultery, cruelty, desertion for two years, separation for two
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Legislators in California responded in 1969 by abolishing all
but two grounds for divorce. "One, incurable insanity, was
already on the books. The other was totally new; divorce was no
longer to be called divorce but 'dissolution of marriage,' and the
new ground that would dissolve it was 'irreconcilable differences'
or, more popularly, 'no-fault.' 1 4 , Once adopted in California, no-
fault divorce quickly spread throughout the rest of the United
States.46  Four years later only nine states exclusively retained




The popularity of no-fault divorce was also evident in Europe
and other parts of North America.' 4  Many European countries
retained fault grounds in their divorce laws along with no-fault
provisions, "but the trend from 1960 onward has clearly been to
replace fault with no-fault clauses specifying marriage
breakdown or mutual consent." 4 9 By mid-century, "fault-based
divorce existed in the thirteen nations of Western Europe with
established divorce policies, no-fault divorce (marriage
breakdown) in seven, and mutual consent divorce in six."15 Two
decades later, fault grounds had been retained by eight nations,
and no-fault divorce had extended to twelve nations, as had
mutual consent divorce. 51 Within twenty years, "Western
years if the respondent did not object, or separation for five years if he or she did."
Id. at 47 (citation omitted). Many opponents of the act argued that maintaining a
"blend of fault and non-fault grounds within a single divorce system would result in
an explosive brew." Id. at 53 (citation omitted). The number of divorces more than
doubled each year since the act went into effect in 1971, possibly proving critics
correct.
145. JONES, supra note 89, at 149.
146. Id. at 158-61.
147. Id. at 159. By 1985, all fifty states had adopted no-fault divorce in some form.
Nicole D. Lindsey, Marriage and Divorce: Degrees of 'I Do,' An Analysis of the Ever-
Changing Paradigm of Divorce, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLy 265, 268 (1998).
148. For a discussion of English divorce legislation, including the adoption of no-
fault divorce, see Lord, supra note 62, at 3-26; Wright, supra note 62, at 176-83, 238-
49. For an overview of Swiss divorce laws, see Graham-Siegenthaler, supra note 81,
at 685-86, 690-93. For an overview of the enactment of law in Ireland allowing no-
fault divorce, see Christopher Price, Finding Fault with Irish Divorce Law, 19 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 669, 680-87, 697-702 (1997) (additionally detailing the
evolution of Canadian divorce legislation); Sarah E. Fette, Comment, Learning From
Our Mistakes: The Aftermath of the American Divorce Revolution as a Lesson in Law
to the Republic of Ireland, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 391, 397-406 (1997). See also
Jorge A. Vargas, Family Law in Mexico: A Detailed Look into Marriage and Divorce,
9 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 5, 73-83 (2002) (detailing Mexican divorce legislation).
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European divorce law had shifted dramatically; in 1960 fault
divorce was common to all divorce codes, whereas by 1981 no-
fault provisions united all but one."52
Despite its popularity however, many American scholars
opposed no-fault divorce and argued that it came at too high a
price. These op onents attributed increasing divorce rates to
no-fault regimes. Moreover, opponents increasingly argued that
no-fault divorce was responsible for the breakdown of American
155
families and has had a devastating affect on children of divorce.
152. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 570-71. Malta remains the only European country
where divorce cannot be legally obtained. See Dr. Ruth Farrugia, International
Marriage and Divorce Regulation and Recognition in Malta, 29 FAM. L.Q. 627, 628-
34 (1995) (detailing marriage law in Malta, including the sole means to dissolve
marriage, i.e. annulment).
153. For a detailed analysis of American divorce rates, see Kenneth Rigby, Report
and Recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute to the House Civil Law
and Procedure Committee of the Louisiana Legislature Relative to the Reinstatement
of Fault as a Prerequisite to a Divorce, 62 LA. L. REV. 561, 562-67 (2002). See also
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Future of Marriage
in the Law, 49 LOY. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (noting that the current U.S. "divorce rate is
more than twice that of 1960, but has declined slightly since hitting the highest
point.., in the early 1980s.") [hereinafter Spaht, Revolution and Counter-
Revolution]. "[Tihe divorce rate jumped by thirty-four percent between 1970 and
1990. In 1990, there were approximately 1.2 million divorces in the United States.
In 1970, about one-third of all marriage ended in divorce. Today, nearly half of all
marriages end in divorce." Lindsey, supra note 147, at 269 (citations omitted).
However, even before 1970, American divorce rates had been increasingly on the rise.
See Heather Flory, 'I Promise to Love, Honor, Obey... And Not Divorce You".
Covenant Marriage and the Backlash Against No-Fault Divorce, 34 FAM. L.Q. 133,
136 (2000) (noting that beginning in 1889, divorce rates in the United States began
to rise about three percent per decade). See also Nichols, supra note 27, at 937-42
(discussing the no-fault divorce revolution and noting that "one major result of...
no-fault divorce laws was a massive increase in the number of divorces[,I" but also
noting that "changes in the divorce law were the response, not the cause of changes
in peoples' attitudes and behaviors."); Erik Wicks, Fault-Based Divorce "Reforms,"
Archaic Survivals, and Ancient Lessons, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1565, 1576-77 (2000)
(arguing that no-fault divorce laws are not a principle cause of the rise in the divorce
rate).
154. See generally LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA (1985); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1997);
Spaht, Revolution and Counter-Revolution, supra note 153, at 1-6.
155. See Flory, supra note 153, at 137-38 (noting that "[ailmost three decades after
the first no-fault divorce laws were introduced, the 'liberal' divorce laws have been
blamed for everything from poverty to lower SAT scores."); Spaht, Revolution and
Counter-Revolution, supra note 153, at 17 (arguing that "[a] marriage that lasted
provided 'protection to women and children from men who would take advantage of
women sexually without being willing to make a commitment to either the woman or
any children that resulted from their relationship.'" (citing WEITZMAN, supra note
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In response to these criticisms, at least two American states have
enacted legislation seeking to increase the stability of marriage,
156and the American families.
VIII. LOUISIANA'S COVENANT MARRIAGE ACT: A
BACKLASH AGAINST NO-FAULT DIVORCE?
In the summer of 1997, the Louisiana Legislature adopted
the Covenant Marriage Act (the Act), by Act 1380. The Act
defines covenant marriage as "a marriage entered into by one
male and one female who understand and agree that the
marriage between them is a lifelong relationship." 7 The parties
who intend to contract a covenant marriage may do so "by
declaring their intent to do so on their application for a marriage
license.., and executing a declaration of intent to contract a
covenant marriage." 15 "The application for a marriage license
and the declaration of intent shall be filed with the official who
issues the marriage license.'
Although the Act purports "to preserve the family" 6 ° by
strengthening "the institution of marriage... [and] restoring
legal efficacy to the marital vows [,] "16 the Act does provide for
dissolution of the covenant marriage. s' Under the Act,
154, at 323-56)).
156. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West 1991 & Supp. 2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-
901 (1999).
157. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A). The Act also provides that:
[p]arties to a covenant marriage have received counseling emphasizing the
nature and purposes of marriage and the responsibilities thereto. Only when
there has been a complete and total breach of the marital covenant commitment
may the non-breaching party seek a declaration that the marriage is no longer
legally recognized.
Id.
158. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(B). See also id. § 9:273 (listing the requirements
of a declaration of intent); id. § 9:273.1 (providing a suggested form for the recitation
which may be used by the couple to a covenant marriage).
159. Id. § 9:272(B). The Act also allows married couples to "execute a declaration of
intent to designate their marriage as a covenant marriage to be governed by the laws
relative thereto." Id. § 9:275(A). See also id. § 9:275(B) & (C) (providing
requirements for converting a non-covenant marriage into a covenant marriage); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:275.1 (suggesting a form of declaration of intent for married
couples converting non-covenant marriage into covenant marriage).
160. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Why Covenant Marriage? A Change in Culture for the
Sake of the Children, 46 LA. B.J. 116, 117-18 (1998) [hereinafter Spaht, Why
Covenant Marriage?].
161. Id. at 118.
162. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:307-309.
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[A] spouse to a covenant marriage may obtain a judgment of
divorce only upon proof of any of the following:
(1) The other spouse has committed adultery.
(2) The other spouse has committed a felony and has been
sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor.
(3) The other spouse has abandoned the matrimonial
domicile for a period of one year and constantly refuses to
return.
(4) The other spouse has physically or sexually abused the
spouse seeking the divorce or a child of one of the spouses.
(5) The spouses have been living separate and apart
continuously without reconciliation for a period of two years.
(6)(a) The spouses have been living separate and apart
continuously without reconciliation for a period of one year
from the date the judgment of separation from bed and
board
163 was signed.16
Proponents of the Act hail it as a revolutionary mechanism
that will enforce and preserve the sanctity of marriage. The
163. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307(B). The "[s]eparation from bed and board in a
covenant marriage does not dissolve the bond of matrimony, since the separated
husband and wife are not at liberty to marry again; but it puts an end to their
conjugal cohabitation, and to the common concerns, which existed between them."
Id. § 9:309(A)(1). Moreover, "[s]pouses who are judicially separated from bed and
board in a covenant marriage shall retain that status until either reconciliation or
divorce." Id. § 9:309(A)(2). See also id. § 9:309(B) (discussing effect of judgment of
separation from bed and board).
164. Id. § 9:307(A). The time period is reduced if the separation from bed and
board was based on abuse of a child of one or both of the spouses. Id. §
9:307(A)(6)(b).
165. "Principally, the covenant marriage strengthens the institution of marriage by
restoring the legal efficacy to the marital vows." Spaht, Why Covenant Marriage?,
supra note 160, at 118. Spaht, the author of the Act and one of its most prominent
supporters, describes the Covenant Marriage Act as a "novel and historical social
experiment." Katherine Shaw Spaht, What's Become of Louisiana Covenant
Marriage Through the Eyes of Social Scientists, 47 LOY. L. REV. 709, 710 (2001).
However, the direct inspiration for covenant marriage is an unenacted Florida bill
that was proposed in 1990, but never received a full hearing. Cynthia Samuel, Letter
From Louisiana: An Obituary for Forced Heirship and A Birth Announcement for
Covenant Marriage, 12 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 183, 190-91 (1997); see also Nichols,
supra note 27, at 943-44. Moreover, "the idea of two kinds of state-recognized
marriage has an antecedent in France[,]" where "Henri Mazeaud proposed to the
commission to reform the Code Civil that the law should allow couples to choose
between indissoluble marriage, for which there would be no divorce, and dissolvable
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premarital counseling component of the Act, according to its
proponents, will "stress[] the seriousness of marriage and the
expectation that the couple's marriage will be lifelong."16   The
Act's stiffer divorce provisions will empower "the 'innocent' spouse
who has kept her promises and desires to preserve the
marriage."167 Finally, proponents of the Act maintain that the
marriage vows embodied in the Declaration of Intent require
couples that have entered into covenant marriages to "take all
'reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, including marriage
counseling.'"168
Critics of the Act argue that it is wrongly perceived as a
remedy to high divorce rates. 169  Those critics describe its pre-
marriage, for which divorce would be possible." Samuel, supra at 191. This proposal
was rejected by a vote of nine to two. Id. at 192.
166. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and
Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 74 (1998) [hereinafter Spaht, Louisiana's
Covenant Marriage]. Spaht maintains that "[miandatory pre-marital counseling
insures not only that an 'educational' obstacle to hasty marriage is erected, but also
that two documents be executed and signed by the couple, the counselor, and a
notary attesting to the fact that the counseling did occur." Id. at 85.
167. Id. at 78. According to Spaht, "[tihe 'innocent' spouse's bargaining power can
be exercised to insist upon serious counseling in an effort to preserve the marriage,
or barring counseling's success, to demand financial advantages for herself or for her
children." Id. at 79. Because "the right to receive an interim allowance.., exists at
least until divorce and an interim allowance is ordinarily a larger sum than final
spousal support, the 'innocent' spouse who receives such an allowance enhances her
already considerable bargaining power during the lengthy two-year period." Id.
Spaht also maintains that "[tihe 'innocent' spouse to a covenant marriage should be
permitted easy access to Louisiana courts, especially for a legal separation, in an
effort to assure enforcement of the contractual provisions of her covenant marriage."
Id. at 112-13.
168. Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage, supra note 166, at 74-75. While the
Act suggests that marital counseling is an example of reasonable steps, "[niothing in
the agreement or the legislation suggests that marriage counseling is the exclusive
'reasonable' step." Id. at 99. Other examples of reasonable steps include, but are not
limited to, sessions with family or friends,... religious community support
groups,... living in separate bedrooms in the same house,... separate buildings on
the same piece of property, or in separate dwellings while the spouses discuss the
marital disharmony. Id. The steps, however, must be taken in an attempt to
"preserve the marriage." Id. at 100. Moreover, Spaht argues that the obligation to
take reasonable steps to preserve the marriage
creates a legal obligation. Should one breach the obligation he assumed in the
agreement, the other spouse may exercise legal remedies for breach of contract.
Even though the obligation to take reasonable steps to preserve the marriage is
an obligation 'to do,' thus generally precluding the remedy of specific
performance, the court may award damages of a pecuniary or non-pecuniary
nature.
Spaht, Why Covenant Marriage?, supra note 160, at 118.
169. See Carriere, supra. note 140, at 1703-04 ("The appeal of the Covenant
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marital counseling requirement as vague and insufficient.7 0
Moreover, critics object to the use of fault-based regimes that
were in effect when divorce was at its fastest rate of increase.'
71
Marriage Act is the perception that it provides weapons to fight what proponents
view as a spiraling divorce rate.... The weapons that it has chosen to lower the
divorce rate are unlikely to achieve that goal."); Flory, supra note 153, at 134
("Rather than attacking the problem of divorce by calling for the 'good old days' of the
fault system and creating artificial distinctions between 'regular' and 'extra-strength'
marriage, it is time to focus on preventative measures .... ").
170. This argument has two parts. First, "[t]he pre-entry counseling prescribed by
the Act is so minimal that it can easily be meaningless." Carriere, supra note 140, at
1705. This can best be explained by example of the first New Orleans area couple
that redesignated their non-covenant marriage to a covenant marriage. The couple
arrived at the Jefferson Parish courthouse without having undergone
counseling. But it just so happened that there was [a counselor], five floors up:
the Rev. Ned Pitre, who works a day job at the parish personnel department....
Pitre counseled the couple briefly on the rules of covenant marriage. A few
minutes later, Justice of the Peace Vernon Wilty checked the documents and
notarized the forms.
Id. at 1708 n.42 (citing Joanna Weiss, Covenant Couple: New Vows Make Breaking
Up Harder to Do, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 19, 1997, at B1).
Secondly, critics point to the fact that the Act "offers no definition of premarital or
marital counseling and no statement of how long such counseling should last.
Moreover, the [Sitate [of Louisiana] places no restrictions on who may qualify to act
as a marriage 'counselor.'" Id. at 1707-08. According to Flory, "The law[ ]... do[es]
not specify how much counseling is necessary nor how long it is to last .... For
premarital counseling to be truly effective, covenant marriage legislation must go
beyond these trivial requirements." Flory, supra note 153, at 146 (advocating the
premarital inventory utilized by University of Minnesota Professor David Olsen,
which consists of 125 questions on personal values and perceptions). See also
Melissa S. LaBauve, Covenant Marriages: A Guise for Lasting Commitment?, 43 LOY.
L. REV. 421, 434-38 (1997) (discussing inadequacies of the pre-marital counseling
requirement of Covenant Marriage Act). But see Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant
Marriage, supra note 166, at 77 ("Criticism of the pre-marital counseling component
of the [Covenant Marriage Act] legislation as 'shallow' and lacking in rigorous
content and time specifications fails to recognize that the 'omission' was calculated to
avoid serious objections from those issued an invitation to assist in preserving
marriages."). Carriere also notes that "if the state were to require counseling as a
preliminary to separation or to divorce, it might, under Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971), have to subsidize the counseling for the indigent." Carriere, supra
note 140, at 1712.
171. According to Carriere, the fault-based provisions contained in the Covenant
Marriage Act "substantially replicates a version of the Louisiana divorce law that
was in place during the period when the divorce rate was increasing." Carriere,
supra note 140, at 1721. The divorce rate in the United States had its sharpest
increase from 1962 to the 1980s. Id. "The principle differences between the
Covenant Marriage Act and the Civil Code regime of the 1960s and 1970s are that
the former elevates abandonment from a ground for separation to a ground for
immediate divorce and includes spousal or child abuse as grounds for immediate
divorce." Id. at 1720-21.
At present, Louisiana's non-covenant divorce provisions are contained in Articles 102
and 103 of the Civil Code. "No trial is required for the divorce under Article 102; if
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Finally, critics argue that the Act's divorce provisions will make
divorce more litigious, which in no way will guarantee vindication
for the "innocent" spouse or redress perceived injuries to the
"innocent" spouse, especially if one of the spouses is a sexual or
physical abuser.
172
the elements are satisfied, divorce is granted on a rule to show cause filed after the
requisite period of time has elapsed." Id. at 1719. For a detailed history of Louisiana
divorce legislation, see LaBauve, supra note 170, at 425-31 (also providing historical
comparison of divorce regimes under Covenant Marriage Act and prior Louisiana
divorce law); Rigby, supra note 153, at 576-93 (also providing legal, social science,
and other commentary on cause and rate of divorce).
172. Because the Covenant Marriage Act bars its covenant-marriage partners from
using the no-fault provisions of Civil Code articles 102 and 103 all divorces under the
Act must go to trial. Carriere, supra note 140, at 1722. Moreover,
the longer period of living separate and apart to obtain a no-fault divorce will
increase the litigation of fault grounds with their accompanying defenses....
Increasing the litigiousness of divorce in a covenant marriage, particularly by
encouraging the use of fault grounds, will inevitably increase its acrimony as the
partners trade accusations, denials, and defenses.
Id. An increase in the litigiousness of divorce is also viewed as having the effect of
discouraging reconciliation between the spouses. Carriere points out that, as
opposed to partners who are living separate and apart, "partners who are
marshalling evidence against one another of fundamental violations of the marital
understanding, and accusing each other of these in the public records, are more
likely to nurse a sense of grievance and less likely to be in a mood to resume the
marital life together." Id. at 1724.
Critics also argue that fault-based divorce is far more expensive to obtain because of
the greater amount of litigation that it entails. Id. at 1724. See also LaBauve, supra
note 170, at 440-41 (noting that "divorce in a covenant marriage.., will become a
more exacting process financially" and describing the Covenant Marriage Act as
hastily created legislation). But see Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage, supra
note 166, at 129 (dismissing arguments of critics and maintaining that a guilty
spouse should "expect consequences should his behavior breach the obligations he
solemnly undertook, especially consequences as to his relationship with his
children.").
The issue of the availability of a quick divorce for spouses who are victims of sexual
or physical abuse by their spouse has also been debated. Critics point to the fact that
"victim[s] of abuse in a covenant marriage would have to attend counseling before the
victim could be granted legal separation or divorce." Nichols, supra note 27, at 954.
While advocates of the law point out "that the law does not require marital
counseling to be joint, with both spouses present[,] . . . it certainly seems that a
victim of spousal abuse should not have to attend 'marital counseling' with the
intention of reconciliation with the abuser[, which] does seem to be what the law
dictate[s]." Id. But see Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage, supra note 166, at
101, 118 (noting that an "abused spouse in a covenant marriage need not wait 180
days or six months to seek a divorce but can file for a divorce immediately with the
concomitant societal judgment about the abuser's conduct" and also arguing that
counseling is not a prerequisite to filing for divorce).
In any event, there is nothing in the law preventing a spouse from establishing
domicile in another state to take advantage of more liberal divorce laws. As
previously discussed,
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Because the Act has only been in place since 1997, it is
impossible to assess whether the law is affecting the divorce
rate. 1  However, "[p]reliminary figures indicated that covenant
marriage legislation will have little effect on divorce rates as a
whole in Louisiana" or any other state adopting a covenant
marriage law.174 Only time will tell whether critics or proponents
of the Act are correct.
CONCLUSION
The shift from fault-based divorce to no-fault divorce in
Western societies was not the result of a radical thinking
legislature, but a return to ancient Roman law.175  "Modern
concepts of 'no[-]fault' divorce, popular since the 1960s and
introduced into the vast majority of American jurisdictions, are
exact replicas of classical Roman law.' 76  Likewise, Louisiana's
[m]igratory divorce results from two factors. The first is the dichotomy in
American cultural values that produced, simultaneously, jurisdictions with
narrow divorce grounds and procedural rigidity, and others with short residence
requirements for divorce and liberal divorce grounds and procedures. The
second is the requirement, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
States Constitution, that all states give recognition to a divorce lawfully granted
in any state.
Carriere, supra note 140, at 1732.
173. Nichols, supra note 27, at 967. Nichols notes that in the first few months of
the law's existence, couples were slow to sign up for covenant marriage and that by
the end of October 1997, East Baton Rouge Parish had received only five applications
for covenant marriage licenses in the ten weeks of the law's effectiveness. Id. at 968.
Of the 400 couples that were married in New Orleans between August 15, 1997 and
October 15, 1997, only two requested covenant marriage licenses. Id.
174. Flory, supra note 153, at 140. During the statewide "Covenant Marriage
Weekend" held during Valentine's Day Weekend 1998, an estimated 4,000-5,000
couples were reported to have opted-in to covenant marriages. Nichols, supra note
27, at 969-70. However, "[o]fficial state records indicate that only 568 couples had
converted to covenant marriages in the period from January 1, 1998 to July 31, 1998,
and an additional 51 conversions of out-of-state marriages occurred over the same
period." Id. at 970. By 2003, "[tlhe total number of newly married couples entering
into covenant marriage in Louisiana continues to be exceedingly small: 2-3%."
Spaht, Revolution and Counter-Revolution, supra note 153, at 51.
Arizona is the only state besides Louisiana to pass covenant marriage legislation.
See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 (West 2000) (providing "out" clause for couples
who agree to the dissolution of their marriage). Other states have introduced, but
failed to adopt, covenant marriage legislation. They include California, Mississippi,
Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Washington, West Virginia, Georgia, Oklahoma, and Alabama. Nichols, supra note
27, at 972-74.
175. See JONES, supra note 89, at 149.
176. Riga, supra note 1, at 931. "This replicates the Roman ex communi consensu
(no fault) .. " Id.
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limited revival of fault-based grounds is a mere regurgitation of
the law.
It is worth noting that married parties during the medieval
period, unlike their Roman counterparts, were required to go
before the canon law courts and take part in some judicial
procedure in order to get an annulment or request a separation
from their spouses. This intrusion into the marriage7 7 and
institutionalization of divorce, unlike the concept of
indissolubility, is one that continues. Moreover, divorce in
modern society is not as free as in classical Roman law, as the
Christian idea that secular or institutional authority can only
dissolve marital unions has remained.
178
177. In fact, the intrusion begins with the requirement that a valid Christian
marriage take place by a priest, as first declared by Ambrose in the fourth century.
See Peter J. Riga, Residue of Romano-Canonical Marriage Law in Modern American
Law, 5 WHIrrIER L. REV. 37, 48 (1983). This intrusion expanded in scope as the
Church began to "direct the spiritual welfare of all Christians... through
prosecutions of sinners and adjudication of civil disputes in which some sacramental
matter, such as oath, marriage, or testament, was at stake." Millon, supra note 25,
at 621 (citation omitted).
178. See Riga, supra note 1, at 931-32.
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